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Would Customs Trade Facilitation Programs stimulate COMESA intra-export flows? 
 




Measures to actively facilitate trade are increasingly seen as essential to assist COMESA region 
in expanding its intra-exports. COMESA intra-export trade is deplorably low. This study 
estimated the impact of Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs), the Automated System for 
Customs Data (ASYCUDA) and the Single Window systems (SWs) on COMESA intra-export 
flows. The study used a gravity model on cross-sectional data for 16 COMESA Member States 
and a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator and found that operational 
AEOs and ASYCUDA systems increase bilateral COMESA export flows by 1.74% and 1.06% 
respectively. Back-to-back functional single windows increase bilateral exports by 5.7%, of 
which 4.7% corresponds to exporting countries and 0.93% to importing countries’ program 
operationalization. Policies aimed at expediting the operationalization of AEOs, the 
ASYCUDA systems and single windows by COMESA Member States is hereby recommended 
for the region to stimulate bilateral intra-export flows. 
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The concept of trade facilitation has, in recent years, received greater attention in the Customs 
fraternity than ever before. According to Grainger, (2012), trade facilitation is the 
simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures1. The United Nations Centre 
for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), defined trade facilitation 
broadly to mean ‘the simplification, standardization and harmonization of procedures, 
associated with trade information and trade payments. Despite countless descriptions, the 
definitions converge on the objective, which is to improve the overall trade environment and 
facilitate seamless movement of goods in foreign trade.  
 
Many developing countries in Africa have initiated unilateral reforms of customs 
administrations and procedures. Few among them, particularly the advanced Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs), East African Community (EAC) for instance, had regional 
reforms. The main objective of these reforms is to simplify customs procedures and facilitate 
trade.  The trade situation in Africa needs urgent attention. The continent is a marginal player 
in global trade in goods despite its size. It is the second-largest continent in the world, covering 
approximately 30 million square kilometers. The continent is approximately three times the 
size of the United States but contributing only 2, 4 percent to global exports in 2018 compared 
to 17, 3 percent, 38, 6 percent and 40 percent for America, Asia and Europe2 respectively.  
 
Africa’s trade supply chain is manifested with high cross border costs and delays resulting from 
inefficient complex border procedures.  Border Posts in Africa are highly inefficient, thick and 
difficult to cross. As a result, trading outside Africa has become cheaper relative to trading 
within. For example, during the launch of Move Africa in Rwanda, in 2016, it was argued that 
it is easier and cheaper for Coca-Cola to buy passion fruit from China, move it to Kenya, bottle 
and sell it in Kenya than to buy it from the next-door Uganda. Long border waiting times and 
high costs of complying with border formalities have been cited as major drivers of trade 
outside the African region.  
 
Literature suggests the application of World Trade Organization (WTO) trade facilitation 
provisions as a possible strategy to re-configure and internalize African trade. These measures 
have been applied and worked well in other regions of the world, the European Union (EU) for 
instance. Whether the same measures would similarly and effectively work in the African 
setting, is less known.  Of course, efforts to illuminate this area is evident.  Studies that 
attempted to shed light in this area examined the impact of individual measures on trade. Rarely 
did these studies attempt to examine the impacts of soft infrastructure, particularly as a bundle 
of reforms due to data limitation. Controversies still exists on which measures effectively work 
for the African region and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
region in particular. This study focuses on customs trade facilitation programs only and seeks 
to investigate their impacts on intra-COMESA exports.  
 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Border Complexities  
Border crossing areas are the most intricate nodes along the trade supply chain. Although costs 
and delays are also incurred behind and beyond the border, several studies, Grainger, (2012), 
Willie, (2018) included, notes that over 60 distinct trade procedures target goods, the vehicles 
(ships, planes and trucks) that move the goods and their operators (drivers, seafarers, flight 
                                                             
1 Where trade procedures are the ‘activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and 
processing data required for the movement of goods in international trade’ (WTO 1998 as quoted in Grainger 2012) 
2 Author calculations based on the UNCTADStat data 
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crew). Border crossing points are fraught with control objects that target revenue collection; 
safety and security matters; environment and health issues; consumer protection; and trade 
policy. Often times and in several countries, a greater proportion of these controls are 
performed by Customs or under Customs supervision. 
 
Moving the goods across borders involve multiple intermediaries that include transport 
operators, trucking and haulage companies, freight forwarders, customs brokers, banks and 
finance companies, insurance companies, port operators and stevedores, and Information 
Technology (IT) systems suppliers, (Grainger, 2012). These intermediaries specialize on their 
particular entitlements. Seldom will they have full knowledge of all the transactions involved 
in the movement of goods nor coordinate between themselves. These acts fall short of the 
customs and trade procedures compliance standard that demands the highest level of 
coordination among the business agents.  
 
Often times, these intermediaries, are required to submit information to countless government 
agencies at many border posts, which themselves operate in silos. Such standards greatly stifle 
the movement of goods across borders. Every time a transaction between one of the parties and 
the government agency occurs, trade transaction costs and time costs in the form of delays 
occur. While modern literature condemns border inefficiencies for distracting smooth 
movement of goods across national borders, other scholars (see Lufuke, 2010) credited them 
for pushing forward the global economic liberalization agenda. Compared to other regions of 
the world, Africa exhibit exorbitant border crossing costs that discourages bilateral movement 
of goods across countries. Exporting and importing goods to and from Africa costs US$776-
00 and US$978-00 respectively, compared to US$170-00 and US$122-00 export and import 
from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) high income 
respectively and US$238-00 and US$245-00 export and import from Europe and Central Asia 
respectively3. 
 
Of all the regions of the world, Africa depicts huge border delays. Whilst it took only 15 hours 
to comply with export formalities in OECD high income and less than 42 hours in Europe and 
Central Asia, it took 169 hours for Sub-Saharan Africa to comply with same formalities. The 
delays heighten when getting commodities into Africa. Importing to OECD high income took 
less than half a day compared to more than 9 days for Sub-Saharan Africa4. Customs delays as 
a subset of border delays in Sub-Saharan Africa are on average, the longest in the world. The 
average delay in Africa is 12 days compared with 7 days in Latin America. Kassahun (2014) 
submits that the longest delays in the region are in Ethiopia which on average took more than 
30 days for customs to clear goods. 
 
The reduction of border impediments to trade is among significant agenda items at the national, 
regional (COMESA, EAC) and Continental (Africa) levels. Like similar regions, European 
Union for instance, COMESA is seriously working to eliminate internal borders to stimulate 
its bilateral trade. Unilateral, bilateral and regional trade facilitation reforms5 targeted at 
providing comparative advantage to the country(s) or region undertaking trade facilitation 
reforms in its customs are significant in COMESA than other regions of the world (Grainger, 
2012). 
 
                                                             
3 Author calculations using World Bank Doing Business, (2020) data 
4 Author calculations using World Bank Doing Business, (2020) data 
5 Implementation of Single Window and ASYCUDA Systems 
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Trade facilitation seeks to reduce impediments in international commerce, the majority which 
are found at the border.  Over 75 percent of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) 
provisions are implemented at the border and manipulate, mostly, the operations of customs. 
Customs, relative to other border agencies, have greater control of national borders and the 
movement of goods. Besides performing their direct functions, they sometimes administer 
duties on behalf of other agencies that are not stationed at the border. Accordingly, focusing 
on implementing measures that increase customs efficiencies is bound to increase bilateral 
trade flows as well.  
 
The link between the implementation of customs-related trade facilitation programmes and 
trade flows, not need more emphasis. In fact, customs trade facilitation programs are more 
relevant now than before, given the ever-rising volumes of trade and increasing trade security 
threats (Granger, 2007a). If not properly handled, customs may be tempted to add yet new 
layers of controls, possibly in the security area, to offset the increasing trade volumes. In this 
regard, customs-related trade facilitation programmes help customs administrations meet their 
duties and effectively perform both the facilitation and control roles.    
 
1.1.2 Customs functions, trade facilitation initiatives and Trade Flows 
Excessive controls and inefficiencies in customs procedures are pervasive features in 
developing economies of the world. One of the obvious reasons is that, majority of their 
governments rely on customs revenue collections in the form of import duties, statutory fees 
and other charges on their budgets. As a result, they are contingently compelled to maintain 
the traditional “gatekeeping” systems that violate trade facilitation objectives. Customs 
functions of such countries are usually flawed with several irregularities that give rise to high 
cross border costs and delays which impedes legitimate trade. 
 
Often times, customs operations in developing economies suffer from manual operations, 
excessive signatures and documentation, lack of and/or outdated equipment, multiple and non-
probabilistic inspections and corruption (Paulo, Octaviano & Cristiano 2015). These 
shortcomings give rise to lengthy and costly customs formalities. The World Bank, Trading 
Across Borders provide annual statistics on performance of governments to manage cross 
border activities. Indications from the data show that clearance times, cross border fees and 
charges and number of documents required are consistent with the implementation level of the 
WTO TFA provisions. 
 
Regions that are ranked low in the implementation commitment rankings, exhibit long 
clearance time, high costs and documentation requirement. Unfortunately, these regions are 
also ranked low in terms of trade, suggesting that, increasing implementation of trade 
facilitation programmes would stimulate trade. Reports shows that developing economies, 
which are ranked low in the implementation matrix, stand more chances to gain in trade than 
developed counterparts6. Table 1 shows the relation between WTO TFA implementation level, 







                                                             
6 World Trade Report, 2015 
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Table 1: WTO TFA implementation level, Time to cross the border, Cross border costs and export flows 
Region TFA 
Implementation 
Level in percentage 
Time to cross border in 
Hours Export (Import) 
Cross border Cost 
in USD Export 
(Import) 
Export region 
share to global 
trade (%) 2018 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
 
100 41.2                  (43.8) 237.6        (244.7) - - 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 
62.2 91                      (98.8) 616.6        (735.7) 5.6 
OECD High Income 
 
100 15                      (11.9) 170.2        (121.6) 54.8 
South Asia 
 
62.2 127.1                 (179.4) 468.5        (734.6) 2.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 27.6 169                    (222.3) 775.6        (977.8) 1.7 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Trading Across Borders, https://www.tfadatabase.org/implementation and 
UNCTADSTAT  
 
The depiction portrays that the level of implementation is consistent with export flows. Regions 
that are advanced in implementation, have achieved higher export flows. Africa, in particular, 
the Sub-Saharan part, is ranked lowest in implementation and contributes only 1.7 percent to 
global exports in 2018. The region had implemented only 27.6 percent of the total TFA 
provisions. Of the implemented provisions, customs trade facilitation programmes have not 
been much considered, possibly because they require significant time and resource 
commitments.  
 
Developing economies, Africa included, are elusive to costs when it comes to implementation 
and mostly rely on development partners for both financial and technical assistance in meeting 
their commitments. This paper challenges the cost sensitive philosophy grappling Africa. 
Rather, the paper argues that, the costs of not implementing the TFA may be far higher than 
the immediate implementation costs. Figure 1 conceptualizes the nexus between customs trade 
facilitation and bilateral trade flows. 
 
Figure 1: Nexus between customs trade facilitation and bilateral trade flows  
 
                      Examples of Customs Trade Facilitation Programmes7 
 Single Window System 
 ASYCUDA Systems 





Reduction in Cross Border Transit Time & Cost 
                                                        
 
                                                  
 




Source: Authors Compilation 
 
                                                             
7 Only trade facilitation programmes that are in categories of Articles V, VIII & X of the GATT 1994, Articles of the WTO 
TFA & Articles of the WCO are considered.    




Measures that seek to simplify8, standardize9 and harmonize10 customs procedures in order to 
expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit are most 
welcome in Africa, particularly in the COMESA region, considering the trade situation which 
have not been appealing despite spirited efforts to eliminate tariff barriers. The growth in intra-
COMESA trade remains low compared to the region’s trade with the rest of the world both in 
terms of exports and imports (Chikabwi, 2020).  The intra-COMESA exports only account for 
6.4 percent of region’s total exports compared to about 20 percent for East African Community 
(EAC) and 62 percent for the EU11. COMESA trade performance is a reflection of huge policy 
investments aimed at reducing tariffs and stimulate trade. Clearly, tariff liberalization has failed 
to jump-start COMESA trade potential. 
 
COMESA needs to focus “outside the tariff box”. Addressing non-tariff barriers, particularly 
border-related bottlenecks could improve COMESA trade situation. Unlocking trade flows in 
the COMESA region demands greater attention on the role of customs in facilitating trade. 
Given that, goods spent the greatest release and clearance time in customs control, means that, 
customs play a crucial role in influencing the speed at which goods cross national borders. 
Theory, however, suggests that, the implementation of trade facilitation programs such as the 
Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), the Single Window System and the 
modern border equipment (scanners), among others, increase border efficiency and 
subsequently trade flows. Unfortunately, the ultimate impact of these interventions to 
COMESA bilateral trade flows are less known. 
 
This paper, therefore, focuses on the impact of customs trade facilitation programs on 
COMESA bilateral trade flows. The paper acknowledges different roles performed by various 
agencies at the border, but asserts that, it is customs that performs the majority of the clearance 
function. The paper, thus, do not disregard the functions of other agencies at the border nor it 
devalue their important roles in the goods clearance process. Our proclamation is that, one way 
or the other, parties involved in trade interface with customs in their operations. As such, 
customs act as a hub for other agencies, thus, implementing customs trade facilitation 
programmes would be implementation for all. The paper, thus, build a case for urgent 
implementation of customs trade facilitation programmes in the COMESA region to stimulate 
bilateral trade flows.  
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Whereas section 2 reviews the literature, 
section 3 and 4 presents the research methodology and the empirical results respectively. The 
last section provides the conclusion and recommendations. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Customs Trade Facilitation and Border Crossing Costs and Delays 
The impact of customs trade facilitation programs on trade flows is transmitted through cross 
border costs and delays. Literature suggest that bilateral trade flows are inversely related to 
border costs and delays. It is further argued that, border costs and delays, are factors of customs 
trade facilitation programs. Customs trade facilitation, is therefore, central in accelerating 
bilateral trade flows. The link between customs trade facilitation and border delays, and 
                                                             
8 Means processes of eliminating unnecessary elements and duplications in customs formalities, process and procedures 
9 Refers to the alignment of domestic customs formalities, procedures, operations and documents with international 
conventions, standards and practices 
10 Refers to processes of developing internationally agreed customs formats for practices and procedures, documents and 
information, (Grainger 2012). 
11 UNCTADSTAT, 2015 
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customs trade facilitation and border costs can be examined using the Queue theory and the 
iceberg model. 
 
2.1.1 The queue theory   
The contemporary management science theory called “queue theory” is critical in the analysis 
of border post management. The theory asserts that, long waiting periods in business are costly. 
Delays cause congestion, which, if not properly managed, can disrupt other business operations 
and clients (Anderson et al. 2011).  They also attract additional cost of creating extra holding 
spaces, possible loss of business, possible loss of good will and a reduction in customer 
satisfaction (Bimha & Bimha, 2018). Maister, (2008), urged managers to understand the 
behaviour of queues, as in frequent times, long queues are associated with poor service quality. 
By analysing queues and their entire implications, managers should calculate the trade-off 
between the costs of improving the service quality (through delay management interventions) 
against the costs of delays to various players in the business and the ultimate benefits expected 
as a result of the interventions. 
 
Improving time-related service quality, in border management scenarios, for instance, involves 
increasing the service rate by modernising border operations through the application of customs 
trade facilitation programmes. Theoretically, customs trade facilitation manipulates border 
clearance times. The majority of delays incurred at the border are amenable to customs trade 
facilitation. Thus, customs trade facilitation measures reduce service time, leading to less 
waiting times. It can therefore be concluded that border delays are a function of customs trade 
facilitation. This statement can be expressed mathematically as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑐𝑡𝑓)         (1) 
 
Where 𝐷𝑖𝑗 stands for bilateral border delays and 𝑐𝑡𝑓 refers to customs trade facilitation.  
 
2.2.2 The iceberg model  
The iceberg cost model, is a simple economic model of modern trade and economic geography. 
The model is built on a strong assumption (Samuelson, 1954) that trade costs are proportional 
to the value of tradable goods, (Alfonso, Andreas & Luca 2010). Accordingly, only a fraction 
of the exported ice reaches its destination as un-melted ice. In order to supply x goods to 
country j, the destination country, from country i, the product originating country, 𝑇𝑖𝑗(x) goods 
should be shipped from country i, where 𝑇𝑖𝑗>1. A constant fraction of x goods, 𝑍𝑖𝑗, melts in 
transit.   Thus, to deliver x goods in country j, more than x goods should be shipped to reimburse 
transit costs, implying an inverse relationship between exports and bilateral trade costs 
(Ferguson & Forslid, 2011).  Similar impact is also expressed in the traditional gravity model, 
where exports from country i to country j are a positive function of the economic masses of the 
trading countries and inversely proportionate to the distance between them. Distance in the 
traditional theory commonly represented trade costs (Groenewald, 2014).  
 
Considering the iceberg and gravity theoretical underpinnings, the objective of stimulating 
bilateral exports cannot be met without interventions to reduce trade costs. Theory suggests 
that trade facilitation manipulates bilateral trade costs. Of all bilateral trade costs, on the border 
costs are more amenable to manipulation by customs trade facilitation. It can therefore be 
concluded that bilateral trade costs are a function of customs trade facilitation. This statement 
can be expressed mathematically as follows: 
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𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑐𝑡𝑓)         (2) 
 
Where 𝜏𝑖𝑗 stands for bilateral trade costs and 𝑐𝑡𝑓 refers to customs trade facilitation.  
 
The queue theory of delays and the iceberg cost model concurred that delays and costs are 
amenable to customs trade facilitation. Mathematically, this statement can be expressed as a 
combination of equation 1 and equation 2 as follows: 
 
𝜏𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑐𝑡𝑓)                  (3) 
 
Where 𝜏𝛿𝑖𝑗 stands for bilateral border costs and delays and  𝑐𝑡𝑓 refers to customs trade 
facilitation.  
 
2.2.3 Customs Trade Facilitation and Trade Flows 
There are several conceptions that explains why countries trade. Among them, the Absolute 
Advantage theory, the Comparative Advantage theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
dominate the literature. Nevertheless, the comparative advantage theory, among competing 
theories, provides a better framework in understanding the nexus between customs trade 
facilitation and trade flows. Founded on strong assumptions of a two-country case, country i 
and j, each producing two goods, good x and good y with fixed means of production which is 
immobile between countries, the theory hypothesises that trade takes place between two 
countries with different comparative advantages, (Wang, Wang, & Lee, 2017).   
 
The theory assumes that efficiency in production is the foundation of trade. Table 2 
demonstrates circumstances under which trade can occur between two countries, country i and 
country j, with different production costs structures, producing two goods, good x and good y.    
 
Table 2: Circumstances under which trade can occur between two countries. 
𝛿𝑖
𝑥 𝛿𝑗













According to the theory, trade can only occur between country i and country j when scenario1 








      (4) 
 
Trade, therefore, occurs when country i produces good x cheaply than country j and country j 
produces good y cheaply than country i. Country i in this scenario is bound to export good x to 
country j, for which it is cost effective in producing than in country j and import good y from 
country j, where it has a comparative disadvantage. The same applies to country j, import good 
x and export good y to country i. This statement can be expressed in mathematical form as 
follows: 𝛿𝑖
𝑥 > 𝛿𝑗




 , scenario 3 
 
Scenario 3 illustrate a case for which trade cannot occur under the comparative advantage 
theory. Countries involved in international trade not only accede to production costs. They also 
incur transaction costs in moving physical goods from the production factories in the exporting 
country, crossing national borders, to the final destinations in the importing country. Suppose 
that country i produces good x for export into country j, the total costs of exporting are 
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𝑥 =  𝛿𝑖
𝑥 +  𝜏𝑖𝑗         (5) 
 
Where 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑥  is the total costs of exporting good x from origin country i to destination country 
j, 𝛿𝑖
𝑥is the production cost of good x in country i and 𝜏𝑖𝑗 are the transaction costs of exporting 
good x into country j.  
 
In order for country i to produce and export good x to country j, the relative total cost of 
producing good x in country i should be lower than that of country j and that the relative costs 
of producing good y in country j should be lower than that of country i. Customs trade 
facilitation can stimulate bilateral trade flows between country i and country j through reducing 
total trade costs ( 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑥). This can be done through manipulating trade transaction costs ( 𝜏𝑖𝑗) 
that can directly reduce total costs or do it indirectly through reduction in production input cost, 
(Yotov et al. 2017).  
 
In summary, economic theory suggests that customs trade facilitation influence trade flows 
through its effects on bilateral border transaction costs and time. This suggests an analytical 
framework summarised by the following system of equations: 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔(𝜏𝛿𝑖𝑗)          (6) 
 
𝜏𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 𝑔(𝑐𝑡𝑓)         (7) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 are exports from country i to country j, 𝜏𝛿𝑖𝑗 are bilateral border costs and delays 
between country i and country j and 𝑐𝑡𝑓  are customs trade facilitation programs.  
 
Equation (6) shows that exports are a function of bilateral border costs and delays and equation 
(7) indicates that bilateral border costs and delays are a function of customs trade facilitation. 
Thus, manipulating customs trade facilitation variables is expected to induce changes in 
bilateral border costs and delays which in turn stimulate exports.  
 
The impact of trade facilitation on trade flows has been interrogated by numerous empirical 
studies across the globe (Michael 2005; Grainger, 2012; Paulo, Octaviano & Cristiano 2015 
and Daniel & Sylvanus 2019). Given that trade facilitation is a broad area, empirical work has 
not been equally distributed across the regions of the world and across TFA programmes 
themselves. While this study acknowledges several studies, which are mostly for single 
countries, little has been done to understand the impact of the same programs on a regional set-
up.  
 
Geofrey & Michael (2018); Nergiz & Ayça (2019) and Inmaculada & Santiago (2020) are 
among the few researchers whose work focused on economic impacts of customs-related trade 
facilitation programmes. Whilst Willie, (2018) examined the effects of implementing digital 
trade facilitation on intra-African exports, the study considered only digital customs-related 
measures. The study focused on the effects of implementing digital trade facilitation and did 
not consider the impacts of existing or rolled-out TFA programmes.  The study took a holistic 
approach and considered the impacts of digital and non-digital customs-related TFA 
programmes on bilateral trade flows.   
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Using author constructed digital trade facilitation implementation scores for all African 
countries and a gravity model, results indicated that a 1% increase in exporter score was 
associated with a 0.28% increase in intra-Africa exports and a 1% increase in the importer score 
was associated with a 0.53% increase in intra-Africa exports. 
 
Nergiz & Ayça (2019) examined the impact of Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program 
on trade of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) Member States for the period 2000-
2017. Using descriptive analysis, convergence analysis and gravity analysis for 132 countries, 
of which 57 were the OIC, both the traditional and the structural gravity analyses indicated no 
impact of AEO adoption on bilateral trade of OIC countries. These findings contrast with those 
by Geofrey & Michael (2018) study. The bio analyzed the impact of AEO operator 
accreditation on trade flows, taking Uganda as a case study. Using import and export (Customs) 
data extracted from Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) ASYCUDA database and matched 
difference-in-differences regression, the study found that AEO accredited firms experienced 
exponential growth in trade, reduced clearance time and increased government tax revenue 
compared to peer firms that were not AEO accredited.  
 
Inmaculada & Santiago (2020), using a structural gravity model for a panel of 176 countries 
from 1995 to 2017, analyzed the impact of Single Window system (SWs) on global trade. The 
study applied a log-log and a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator (PPML) with 
multi-dimensional fixed effects and a linearized gravity model and found that, that, total trade 
between two countries with functioning SWs increases by about 37 percent, of which 23 
corresponds to exports and 14 to imports. Results from the PPML estimation indicate a positive 
and significant effect, which is however much smaller in magnitude. 
 
In developing Africa, trade facilitation programs are mostly implemented under Rec’s auspices.  
Although the reviewed empirical literature has been drawn from both the developed and 
developing world, none of the studies took a regional approach to assess the impact of 
regionalised programs on the region’s trade flows. The impacts of these programs on trade 




Following the theoretical framework given in equations (6) and (7), the study applied the 
gravity model to evaluate the effects of customs trade facilitation programs on bilateral trade 
flows in the COMESA region. The model postulates that bilateral trade between countries is a 
positive function of their economic output and an inverse proportion of the distance between 
them. The model estimated in this study augmented the traditional gravity model by adding 
customs trade facilitation variable as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑗 = exp(𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7Σϕ𝑖𝑗) +  𝑖𝑗         (8) 
 
Where 𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑗 stands for bilateral trade flows between country i and country j, 𝛽0 to 𝛽7 are 
parameters to be estimated, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 is the exporter economic output which is a proxy of supply 
potential, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 is the economic output of the importing country which proxy its market size,  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the distance between the exporting country i and the importing country j, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 
refers to common official language, variable taking values 1, if trading countries have common 
official language and zero, otherwise, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 refers to contingent, the variable taking values 1, 
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if the trading countries shares a border and zero, otherwise, Σϕ𝑖𝑗  is  vector of customs trade 
facilitation programs between country i and the importing country j, and 𝑖𝑗 is the white noise 
error term.  
 
Next, we disaggregated a vector of customs trade facilitation programs into specific and distinct 
programs whose impact were examined by estimating how much trade increases when the 
instruments are implemented. 
 
Σϕ𝑖𝑗 = AEO𝑖𝑗 + 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑐𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑗 +  𝑆𝑊_𝑋𝑖 + SW_M𝑗       (9) 
 
Finally, we estimated a more detailed specification (equation 10) in a multiplicative form using 
the PPML as given in equation 10. Since there are presents of zeros in our exports data, PPML 
estimator performs very well even when the proportion of zeroes is large (Silva and Tenreyro, 
2006).   
 
𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑗 = exp(𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗+ 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7AEO𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑐𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑗+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑊_𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽10SW_M𝑗 ) + 𝑖𝑗  (10) 
 
Where AEO𝑖𝑗 is a dummy taking the value 1 if both countries have operational AEOs, 0 
otherwise, 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑐𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑗 also takes value 1 when both countries have operational ASYCUDA 
systems, 0 otherwise,  𝑆𝑊_𝑋𝑖 takes the value 1 when the exporting country has an operational 
single window, 0 otherwise, similarly, SW_M𝑗 takes the value 1 when the importing country 
has an operational single window, 0 otherwise.  
 
We set our empirical equation in an exponential form following Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 
(2006). We therefore estimate the gravity model with the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) estimator. The use of PPML as an estimator effectively handles the presence of zero 
trade flows and addresses the problem of heteroscedasticity. We also account for the 
unobserved multilateral resistance terms by applying the directional (exporter and importer) 
fixed effects.  
 
3.1 Data Sources 
Cross sectional data for the year 2018 for 16 COMESA countries12 were examined in this study. 
Countries included in the study and the study period were chosen based on data availability.  
Data on ASYCUDA, Single Window and Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs) were 
obtained from the ASYCUDA Database, Inmaculada & Santiago (2020) and the 2019 
compendium of AEO programmes respectively. Variables that capture distance, common 
border, land locked, common colonizer, and common language were accessed from “Centre 
d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales” (CEPII) whilst trade flows data was 
downloaded from IMF-Direction of Trade Statistics. However, due to data gaps, data on trade 
flows was supplemented by data downloaded from the Trade Map-International Trade 
Statistics and the UN Comtrade Database. The supplement data was converted to conform to 
the IMF-Direction of Trade Statistics unit of measurement. GDP data for all countries was 
downloaded from World Development Indicators (WDI) and indexmundi. 
 
 
                                                             
12 Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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4.0 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Intra-COMESA exports reached an average of US$26.39 million in 2018. The variation in 
bilateral export flows is too large as some countries recorded zero flows whilst maximum 
export flows reached US$863.73 million. Zero flows could be because of rounding off, non-
reported data or omission. A huge standard deviation in exports is not surprising. Experience 
shows that COMESA countries export more outside their region than within itself. For instance, 
Zimbabwe is a member of both COMESA and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), however, within Africa and its RECs, Zimbabwe trade more with South Africa, a 
SADC member state than any other COMESA country.  
 
The average operational AEOs in COMESA reached 0.85 in 2018, operational ASYCUDA 
systems reached 0.88, operational single windows in exporting countries 0.25 and importing 
countries 0.25 for the same period. Statistics reveals that COMESA member states have got 
more potential to improve on implementation of single window systems than AEOs and 
ASYCUDA systems. Table 3 contains a summary of the main statistics for the variables used 
in the empirical model.  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Exports (Millions) 26.39 94.70 0 863.73 
GDP_X 4.26 7.36 1.19 3.03 
GDP_M 4.26 7.36 1.19 3.03 
Cont. .1 .30 0 1 
Commlangoff. .63 .48 0 1 
Commoncol. .33 .47 0 1 
AEO .85 .36 0 1 
Asycuda .88 .33 0 1 
SW_X .25 .43 0 1 




4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Preliminary analysis of correlation between exports and customs trade facilitation programs 
indicates that AEO, exporter single window and importer single window are positively 
correlated with exports whilst ASYCUDA system has a theoretically contradicting negative 
coefficient of correlation. The correlation analysis also suggests the presence of a positive 
association between exports and the GDP of the exporting country, GDP of the importing 
country, sharing a border and common colony. However, a negative association is being 
suggested between exports and common official language and distance. Table 4 summarises 
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Table 4: Correlation Analysis 
Variable Exp GDPi GDPj AEO Asyc SW_X SW_M Cont Comla Comcol Dist 
Exports 1.000           
GDPi 0.086 1.000          
GDPj 0.041 -0.067 1.000         
AEO 0.114 0.099 0.180 1.000        
Asycuda -0.030 -0.262   -0.262   -0.018   1.000       
SW_X 0.076 -0.072 0.0048 0.243 -0.073 1.000      
SW_M 0.031   0.005   -0.072 0.243 -0.073 -0.067 1.000     
Cont 0.492 -0.020 -0.020   0.101 -0.126 0.000   -0.000     1.000    
Comla -0.043 -0.263 -0.263   -0.023 0.078 0.120 0.120   0.138 1.000   
Comcol   0.046 -0.195 -0.195 0.000  0.107   -0.020 -0.020 0.177 0.538 1.000  
Dist -0.180 0.387 0.387 -0.025 -0.210 -0.044 -0.044 -0.371 -0.199  -0.224 1.000 
 
4.3 The Gravity Model Regression Results 
The regression results from the gravity model are presented in Table 5. The coefficients for 
customs trade facilitation variables have expected signs and are highly significant implying 
that application of trade facilitation programs stimulate intra-exports in COMESA. A 1% 
increase in operationalization of AEO programs and ASYCUDA Systems in the COMESA 
Member States would increase bilateral export trade by 1.74% and 1.06% respectively. 
Similarly, a 1% increase in the operationalization of the single window system by COMESA 
exporting and importing countries would increase bilateral export flows by 4.78% and 0.93% 
respectively.  
 
These study findings are not surprising. They present a true reflection of COMESA potential 
trade gains. For sure, COMESA had been lagging behind in implementing customs TFA 
programs, especially, digital reforms purportedly due to high cost of implementation. As such 
the implementation of customs trade facilitation is still low in COMESA region as their 
implementation is motivated by the availability of development technical and financial support. 
Again, the fact that these provisions are not mandatory in the WTO TFA and Annex 4 on Trade 
Facilitation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), means that their 
implementation, especially by COMESA countries with weak national budgets, may not be 
prioritised. Thus, these trade facilitation programmes still embody huge potential trade gains 
for the region.  
 
The coefficients for the traditional gravity model variables, exporter’s GDP, importer’s GDP, 
sharing a border and distance between trading countries, all, have expected signs and are highly 
significant. Common official language has the expected sign but is insignificant in explaining 
intra-COMESA exports. Coefficient of common colony is significant though contradicting 
with the theory. Results suggest that common colony reduces intra-COMESA export trade. The 
results are not surprising considering that countries with similar colonial background or who 
have common colony tend to have inherited common colonial systems. As such, these countries 
tend to have similar comparative advantages in production. They, therefore, produce similar 
goods at similar factor costs hence makes it difficult to trade among themselves.  
 
Findings of our paper are comparable with other previous studies.  They are similar to those by 
Inmaculada & Santiago (2020), who found that total trade between two countries with 
functioning single windows increase by approximately 37%, of which 23 corresponds to 
exports and 14 to imports. Our results are also in agreement with those obtained by Geofrey & 
Michael (2018), when they studied the impact of AEO accreditation status on the firm’s trade 
volume in Uganda. Similarly, their study found out that AEO programs motivates trade. Our 
findings, however, contrast with findings by Nergiz & Ayça (2019), who, on assessing impact 
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of AEO programs on bilateral trade of the OIC Member States, found that the adoption of the 
AEO programs by OIC member states has no impact on their bilateral trade. 
 
Table 5: Gravity Model Results  
Variables  Estimated coefficient  Robust standard Error 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 2.38*** 2.29 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 1.33*** 2.16 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 1.87*** 0.33 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 0.14 0.41 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 -0.82* 0.45 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 -0.001*** 0.00 
𝐴𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑗 1.74*** 0.45 
𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑐𝑢𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑗 1.06** 0.44 
𝑆𝑊_𝑋𝑖 4.78*** 0.51 
𝑆𝑊_𝑀𝑗  0.93** 0.43 
𝛽0 -1.62 0.83 
Observations 240  
Adjusted R-squared .92850629  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.0 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This study estimated the impact of AEOs, the ASYCUDA and the single window systems on 
COMESA intra-export flows. The obtaining intra-COMESA export level of 11.9% compared 
to 18.7%; 17.9% and 63.6% for EAC, SADC and EU respectively are of concern to the region. 
COMESA is reputable for trading outside its region than within itself. The study used a gravity 
model on cross-sectional data for 16 COMESA Member States and a PPML estimator and 
found that operational AEOs and ASYCUDA systems increase bilateral COMESA export 
flows by 1.74% and 1.06% respectively. Back-to-back functional single windows increase 
bilateral exports by 5.7%, of which 4.7% corresponds to exporting countries and 0.93% to 
importing countries’ program operationalization.  Policies aimed at expediting the 
operationalization of AEOs, the ASYCUDA systems and single windows by COMESA 
Member States is hereby recommended for the region to stimulate bilateral intra-export flows. 
Future studies that build on ours might consider the impact of bilateral or regional integrated 
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